Approved For Release 100 P. 29 SEGRE 100975A005000080001-7

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9 March 1960

Copy No. C 68

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 8	
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.	-
CLASS. CH:NGED TO: TS & 6	
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010	
6 JUN 1980	_

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Approved For Release 2002/04/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000080001-7

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9 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR-Iran: The USSR, concurrent with its efforts to increase covert contacts with anti-Shah groups in Iran, is making efforts to arouse the Shah's suspicions of his closest associates and of Iran's allies. On 7 March, Radio Moscow charged that during President Eisenhower's recent visit to Ankara, Turkish President Menderes gave him the names of prominent Iranians who are allegedly plotting a coup d'état in Tehran. The Soviet clandestine "National Voice of Iran" recently alleged that Gen. Bakhtiar, Iran's intelligence chief, and Gen. Nasiri, head of the Royal Guard, are competing for US support in plots to overthrow the Shah.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

New Delhi's announcement on 7 March agree-India-USSR: ing in principle to "collaborate" with Moscow in the design and construction of nuclear power stations opens the way for the USSR's participation in India's nonmilitary nuclear development program under the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). The announcement, however, made no reference to previously reported offers of Soviet credits for the first plant. New Delhi may be delaying a decision on foreign aid for this plant pending talks with US AEC officials now visiting India and further exploration of British interest. Indian AEC Chairman Bhabha's plan to lead a delegation to Moscow in May or June, presumably after financing of the first plan is settled, suggests that his government, as previously indicated, would prefer Soviet aid for a projected second or third atomic power plant rather than the first plant. (Page 3)

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25X6 25X6 Pakistan-Afghanistan: Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 7 March that since Khrushchev had openly sided with Kabul on the question of self-determination for Pushtoon tribesmen, Pakistan would now demand a plebiscite to determine whether Pushtoons living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan. Rawalpindi probably hopes this new ploy will strengthen its influence over its own Pushtoon tribes and

Afghanistan from continuing its agitation for a plebiscite in Pakistan and to establish a strong talking point in any negotiations which might eventually be arranged.


(Page 4)

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Seeks to Play on Shah's Suspicions

The USSR's year-old propaganda compaign against Tehran has taken a new turn with broadcasts designed to arouse the Shah's suspicion of his close associates in the government and of Iran's allies. On 7 March, Radio Moscow charged that during President Eisenhower's visit in December to Turkey, President Menderes gave him a list of influential Iranians, including military figures, who are allegedly 'preparing a coup d'état' The broadcast accused Turkish officials of trying to convince the President that the Shah's regime is unstable and that he "must be replaced." Radio Moscow also claimed that leaflets are being distributed in Tehran and other Iranian cities, urging Iranians to "overthrow the rotten and perfidious Pahlavi dynasty."

The Soviet clandestine station "National Voice of Iran," in recent broadcasts to Iran, has accused General Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), and General Nasiri, head of the Royal Guard, of competing for support from the United States in rival plots to overthrow the Shah.



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	Moscow's bid to create distrust in Tehran and apparently to eliminate potential pro-Western successors of the Shah	7 25X1
	coincides with recent Soviet efforts to establish direct con-	
	tacts with antiregime nationalist groups and to build up a subversive potential inside Iran through the outlawed Tudeh	
	(Communist) party. are con-	
	tinuing to express concern over increasing activities among pro-Communist elements, especially in view of serious eco-	25X1
	nomic problems which are expected to develop during the	
25X1	balance of 1960.	25X1
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Indian Cooperation With USSR in Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy

The agreement in principle by Indian and Soviet atomic energy officials to collaborate in the design and construction of nuclear power stations opens the way for the USSR's participation in India's nonmilitary atomic development program under the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66). New Delhi's announcement on 7 March, however, following talks with Moscow's top expert on peaceful uses of atomic energy, makes no reference to previously reported offers of Soviet credits for the first nuclear reactor to be constructed. Several Soviet leaders have recently offered publicly to help the Indians set up a nuclear power station, although it is not clear whether a specific proposal has been made.

New Delhi recently decided to establish its first nuclear power station near Ahmedabad in Bombay State. Two or more additional reactors are being considered for inclusion in the Third Plan, but a decision has been deferred because of financing problems and differences among planning officials.

New Delhi may be delaying a decision on foreign assistance for the first plant until discussions with the US AEC delegation now visiting India are completed. Indian officials may also wish to explore further Britain's expressed interest in financing the plant. They had previously indicated to American and British officials that India would prefer its first plant to be built under Western aegis, although the government might be interested in Soviet assistance for a second or third plant. Indian AEC chairman Bhabha's plan to take a delegation of atomic experts to Moscow in May or June, presumably after financing of the first plant is settled, also suggests that New Delhi is primarily interested in using Soviet aid for these additional power stations. Should Western terms prove to be less favorable than Moscow's, however, New Delhi might eventually accept a Soviet bid on the original plant.

eventually accept a Soviet bid on the original plant.	25X1
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Pakistan Demands Plebiscite Among Pushtoons Living In Afghanistan

Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 7 March that, since Khrushchev had openly sided with Kabul on the question of self-determination for Pushtoon tribesmen living in Pakistan, Rawalpindi would demand a plebiscite to determine whether Pushtoons living in Afghanistan wish to join Pakistan. Pakistani President Ayub has consistently maintained the public stand that the whole Pushtoonistan dispute is a "phony stunt" by the Afghan Government, although Pakistan recently intensified Pushtu-language propaganda broadcasts accusing Kabul of oppressing its Pushtoon citizens.

The Pakistani Government has probably felt that its position was too defensive, since Afghanistan had focused attention on self-determination for Pakistan's Pushtoons. Having begun a propaganda counteroffensive addressed to all Pushtoons themselves, the Pakistanis now seem to be establishing a bargaining position with an eye to possible future talks with the Afghans. They will almost certainly insist that any such talks cover Pushtoons on both sides of the border, probably hoping that Kabul will refuse to discuss any but Pakistan's Pushtoons.

	influence over its own Pushtoon tribes, who make up about	0.5)//
	a tenth of the population, and	25X6
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	million Pushtoons in Afghanistan, which has a total population of ten to twelve million.	
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